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GENOCIDE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Charles H. Anderton1
ABSTRACT
This article surveys risk factors for genocide and genocide prevention from the perspectives of
four social science disciplines: sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics.
Each discipline brings a valuable set of concepts and tools to bear in genocide research.
Moreover, fruitful multi- and inter-disciplinary collaboration across the four disciplines (and
other fields) is shedding new insights into why genocide has have been such a recurring tragedy
in human affairs and how such atrocities can be prevented.
Key words: Genocide, Mass Killing, Genocide Prevention, Behavioral Experiments, Loss
Aversion, Psychic Numbing
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INTRODUCTION
When people hear the word genocide, they often think of the Holocaust (1933-1945) in
which leaders in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe fostered the extermination of roughly
six million Jews and millions more across other groups (e.g., Roma, Soviet prisoners of war,
Poles, religious objectors, homosexuals, handicapped). In the 1950s, research attempting to
explain why the Holocaust occurred began to emerge. Much of the early research suggested the
Holocaust happened because Nazi leaders and other perpetrators suffered from psychopathology
(i.e., they were “mad”), had corrupted personalities (i.e., they were “bad”), and/or were products
of a deeply embedded anti-Semitic culture (i.e., extreme ideology) (Gilbert 1950, Dicks 1950,
Waller 2007, chapters 1-4). Waller (2007) characterizes this early view of the Holocaust as the
“extraordinary origins of extraordinary evil,” which I label simply as the “Bad Nazi Thesis.”
A major problem with the “Bad Nazi Thesis” is that genocides are not rare. Since the end
of World War II, more than 40 genocides and at least 100 non-genocidal forms of large-scale
intentional killings of civilians, known as mass killings, have been documented (Anderton 2016).
If genocide and other forms of mass atrocity require uncommon personalities and/or unusually
extreme ideologies, why are they such an ordinary feature of human behavior? A second major
problem with the “Bad Nazi Thesis” is that new research in the 1970s and 1980s painted a
distinctly different picture of the origins of the Holocaust and other genocides. Led by
sociologists (e.g., Helen Fein, Leo Kuper), social psychologists (Israel Charny, Ervin Staub),
political scientists (e.g., Barbara Harff, Robert Melson), and historians (e.g., Rouben Paul
Adalian, Christopher Browning), the new research emphasized the “ordinary origins of
extraordinary evil” (Waller 2007, chapters 5-8). In this new paradigm, the architects and
perpetrators of the Holocaust and other genocides seemed to be ordinary people; they scored
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within normal ranges on standard personality tests and their behaviors, outside of atrocity
perpetration, in such contexts as family life and community relations were normal and even
commendable (see personal case histories of perpetrators in Waller 2007). The new research also
highlighted the goal orientations of genocide architects and perpetrators, which varied
considerably, but nonetheless implied that the conception and execution of various phases of
mass atrocity could serve strategic purposes and in this sense be seen as “rational.”
The objective of this article is to highlight perspectives from the social sciences into the
“ordinary” and even “rational” origins of genocides and how they might be prevented.2 Many
social science disciplines, as well as disciplines in the humanities (e.g., history, languages,
philosophy, religion, visual arts) and sciences (e.g., biology, neurobiology, psychopathology),
provide valuable insights into genocidal behavior, but it is beyond the scope of this article to
survey such a breadth of literature. Instead, I focus upon critical insights into genocide risk and
prevention from four social science disciplines: sociology, social psychology, political science,
and economics. Even within this limited set of disciplines, given space constraints, my surveys
must be selective and brief.
The essay is organized as follows. The next two sections cover definitions and data
patterns of genocides and mass killings. The subsequent section surveys key ideas on genocide
risk from sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics. The four disciplines are
not separate silos for studying genocide because many of the key aspects of genocidal behavior
have multiple and reinforcing wellsprings emanating from conditions that are studied within
2

The notion of “ordinary” and “rational” origins of genocide in no way implies that genocide is reasonable.
Obviously, such atrocities are horrific and should be condemned. When social scientists and other scholars seek to
understand the motives of genocide perpetrators, the motives discovered do not justify the actions of the
perpetrators. In a similar manner, police detectives seek to identify the motives of suspects in murder investigations,
not to justify the motives of the murderer but to find the perpetrator and bring her or him to justice. Moreover, by
better understanding the motives of genocide perpetrators, scholars, policymakers, and activists can hopefully
reduce the number and seriousness of such atrocities in the future.
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these disciplines. Hence, the four disciplinary viewpoints also point to fruitful interdisciplinary
perspectives for understanding genocide. The concluding section sums up with several thoughts
on the disciplinary and interdisciplinary study of genocide and its prevention.

DEFINITIONS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER MASS ATROCITIES
In his seminal 1944 book on the Holocaust, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Raphael
Lemkin combined the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing) to form a new
word: genocide. In its briefest form, genocide means to kill or destroy a people group. Lemkin,
however, spent chapter 9 of his ground-breaking book, and really the whole book, explaining
how much he meant by the term genocide. For example, Lemkin emphasized that genocide has
two phases: (1) “destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” and (2) “imposition
of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin 1944, p. 79). Hence, genocide is not just the
elimination of a people group, it also involves the flourishing of the oppressor group in place of
(and at the expense of) the oppressed. Furthermore, genocide was a “synchronized attack” and a
“coordinated plan of different actions” directed against an oppressed group’s existence (Lemkin
1944, pp. xi and 79). The synchronization and various actions of genocide struck across eight
dimensions or “fields” in which group elimination was accomplished:
[I]n the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a
German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the social
field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing
elements such as the intelligentsia …); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or destroying
cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for
education in the liberal arts …); in the economic field (by shifting wealth to Germans and
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by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not promote
Germanism “without reservations”); in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation
and by promoting procreation by Germans in occupied countries); in the field of physical
existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass
killings …); in the religious field (by interfering with the activities of the Church …); in
the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement …)
(Lemkin (1944, pp. xi-xii).
Among the many critical aspects of Lemkin’s conceptualization of genocide are three that I
emphasize: (1) genocide is multifaceted; it is an assault upon many, and in some cases all, of the
eight essential foundations of a people group’s existence; (2) genocide does not necessarily
imply outright physical killing, although it usually does; nevertheless, a targeted group can be
eliminated by prohibiting its procreation and/or destroying its culture, institutions, and religion
and forcing it to assimilate into the dominant group; and (3) the nature and actions of genocide
plague so many aspects of human life that perspectives from multiple disciplines are not just
desirable, but essential, for understanding genocide risk and prevention.
It was Lemkin’s dream to see genocide become a punishable crime in international law
and he worked tirelessly toward that end through the United Nations, political leaders, and other
organizations (Waller 2016). In December 1948, the United Nations established genocide as a
crime under international law. In Article II of the 1948 United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is defined as
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
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inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (United Nations 1948).
Note that the dimensions of genocide under Lemkin’s conceptualization are much
broader than the Convention’s. The Convention focuses on the physical destruction of an
oppressed group such as killing, serious bodily harm, and physical destruction (see parts
a-c). Certainly physical destruction of a people group is critical in Lemkin’s conception
of genocide, but the “physical” is just one of Lemkin’s eight fields.
A large literature analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptions of genocide
offered by Lemkin and the Convention including criticisms regarding groups left out (e.g.,
political groups), difficulties with proving intent, and the inability of the Convention to prevent
genocide. Many scholars have proposed their own definitions of genocide and other civilian
atrocity concepts. For example, some scholars distinguish genocide and mass killing where
genocide is the targeting of a group for destruction based on the group’s characteristics (e.g.,
ethnicity, race, religion) and mass killing is civilian destruction without a clear designation of
group membership or where the intention to eliminate the group as such is absent (Staub 1989, p.
8; Waller 2007, p. 14). Other scholars, however, maintain that distinguishing genocide and mass
killing runs into difficulties regarding perpetrator intentions or characteristics of targeted groups
so that it is not fruitful for research to distinguish the two (see, e.g., Ulfelder and Valentino
2008). Still others argue that the term genocide does not need to be distinguished from other
forms of intentional violence against civilians “because genocide gives us a framework for
bringing together the varied phenomena of anti-civilian violence and understanding the
relationships among them” (Shaw 2003, p. 153). To complicate matters further, there are other
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atrocity crimes distinct from but often associated with genocide including war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Following Anderton and Brauer (2016b), I categorize
genocide, mass killing, and other atrocity crimes under the broad category of mass atrocities.3 A
continuing challenge for genocide research is how to conceptualize genocide and when to
distinguish it from and integrate it with other forms of atrocities against civilians.

PATTERNS OF GENOCIDES AND MASS KILLINGS
Figure 1 shows the number of states perpetrating genocides and mass atrocities
(genocides and mass killings) per year over the period 1956-2014. A key message of Figure 1 is
that for the almost 60 years covered by the genocide data there were one or more genocides in
the world each year with the exception of 2012. Furthermore, for the mass atrocity data there
were at least two, and often far more than two, mass atrocities in the world each year.
Figure 2 shows estimated fatalities from selected state-perpetrated post-World War II
genocides. The data are extremely disturbing when considering that the victims of such atrocities
are noncombatant civilians, including children and the elderly along with male and female
adults. Moreover, such fatalities sometimes occur after severe brutalities were inflicted on the
victims including rape, torture, and coercing people to rape or kill family members (von JoedenForgey 2016). Furthermore, according to Anderton (2016), estimated fatalities totaled over only
three of the genocides in Figure 2 (Cambodia 1975-1979, Pakistan 1971, and Sudan 1983-2002)

3

According to Anderton and Brauer (2016b), “Crimes against humanity are systematic attacks against civilians
involving inhumane means such as extermination, forcible population transfer, torture, rape, and disappearances.
War crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions including willful killing, willfully causing great suffering
or serious injury, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, and torture. Ethnic cleansing is the removal of
a particular group of people from a state or region using such means as forced migration and/or mass killing
(Pégorier 2013). Ethnic cleansing is not, however, defined as an atrocity crime under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.” For reviews of mass atrocity definitions and controversies see Curthoys and Docker
(2008), Meierhenrich (2014, pp. 56-104), and Waller (2016).
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surpasses the total estimated military fatalities for the 239 civil (intrastate) wars fought over the
period 1900 to 2014. Anderton also documents that about as many people were killed in six
weeks during the 1994 Rwandan genocide (estimated to be 315,000) as died in all worldwide
international and domestic terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2014 (estimated to be 307,000).
Figures 1 and 2 focus on mass atrocities perpetrated by states, but nonstate groups
perpetrate atrocities too. Anderton (2016) documents about three dozen nonstate groups that
carried out mass atrocities within the 1989 to 2014 period. Furthermore, the only dataset that
specifically tracks genocides, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), has designated the
Islamic State as a perpetrator of genocide in its 2014 update (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015).
This is the first time that PITF has identified a nonstate group as the main perpetrator of
genocide.
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FIGURE 1 – Number of state-perpetrated genocides and mass atrocities by year, 1956-2014
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FIGURE 2 – Estimated fatalities from selected state-perpetrated post-World War II genocides

Afghanistan, 1978-92

1,176,000

Angola, 1975-94, 1998-2002

666,000

Bosnia, 1992-95

228,000

Burundi, 1965-73, 1988, 1993

189,750

Cambodia, 1975-79

2,700,000

Central Afr. Rep., 2013-14

7,500

China, 1966-75

480,000

El Salvador, 1980-89

49,450

Guatemala, 1978-90

71,400

Iraq, 1988-91

336,000

Pakistan, 1971

2,000,000

Rwanda, 1994

750,000

Sudan, 1983-2002

1,924,000

Sudan-Darfur, 2003-11

400,500

Uganda, 1971-79, 1980-86

456,000
0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

Estimated Fatalities
SOURCE:

Midpoint fatality estimates based on the Political Instability Task Force geno-politicide dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and
Harff 2015)

11
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 imply that genocides and mass killings occur quite
frequently in human affairs. The number of such atrocities is counted per year rather than per
decade. Imagine if the number of major airline crashes in a year was eight or ten; the flying
public would be in a state of fear and rightly so. And yet, the average number of mass atrocities
(genocides and mass killings) present per year in the world since 1956 is 24, and such incidents
correspond to fatalities, not in the hundreds, but often in the tens or hundreds of thousands. It is
as if the international community and people generally are numb to the devastation wrought by
mass atrocities. Another truly disturbing aspect implied by Figures 1 and 2 is that many
“ordinary” people must participate for mass atrocities to occur. Outside of major city bombing
campaigns or weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear, biological weapons), it is not possible
for a small group of leaders to kill thousands or even millions of civilians. Such atrocities require
that thousands of perpetrators go along with the desires of genocide architects for such
devastation to occur. Such people cannot, for the most part, be psychopathological because
psychopathology is relatively rare. Hence, one of the great challenges of genocide research is to
understand how ordinary people can be swept up into perpetrating, or not resisting, genocide and
mass killing. The social sciences provide important insights into these and other disturbing
aspects of mass atrocities, to which I now turn.

PERSPECTIVES ON GENOCIDE FROM SELECTED SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES

SOCIOLOGY
Shaw (2010, p. 142) characterizes genocide as a “peculiarly sociological crime” because
the very nature of genocide is one in which social classification is manipulated, distorted, and
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perverted against one or more groups by atrocity architects and other perpetrators. Until the late
1970s, the discipline of sociology did not recognize genocide as a phenomenon that should be
analyzed in sociological terms. The neglect was due, in part, to the discipline’s unwillingness to
look at extreme human behavior including “evil” (Shaw 2010, p. 144).
Pioneering research on the Holocaust and genocide by sociologists Helen Fein (1979,
1993), Leo Kuper (1977, 1981), and Zygmunt Bauman (1989) opened the door to the
sociological study of genocide. Such research has contributed to greater understanding of what
genocide is and is not and, most significantly, to the roles that social categorization, structure,
and processes play in precipitating genocide. One of the distinctive contributions of the early
sociological research on genocide was to show how a people group within a broader society
could come to be designated as “alien” or “other” by political leaders in a society. In extreme
cases of such “othering,” people from the out-group would, to use Fein’s phrase, “fall outside the
universe of moral obligation” of the dominant group. When people from the out-group are so
designated, they are often treated discriminatorily and may come to be treated murderously by
people from the dominant group.
In-group/out-group discrimination exists just about everywhere, so the key issue is not
the existence of “othering” per se, but the circumstances in which it can become so extreme that
it crosses into genocide. The early sociologists maintained, as do virtually all genocide scholars
today, that there is not one path or formula by which genocide breaks out and spreads. Rather,
there are various enabling circumstances that can foster genocide. Moreover, genocide often
emerges in phases in which the initial goals of the perpetrators do not include outright
extermination of the victim group. Two key questions for the early sociologists (and they remain
highly relevant today) were: (1) What social factors and conditions cause a people group to
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become an out-group? (2) What are the enabling circumstances that cause mistreatment of the
out-group to cross into genocide? It is beyond the scope of this article to survey in detail the
work of the early sociologist on these two questions. Instead, I provide a brief overview of the
thinking of two early sociologists on the questions: Helen Fein and Leo Kuper.
Fein (1979, pp. 8-10) maintains that the outing of a people group can benefit a state’s
political leaders when it increases the state’s legitimacy and the dominant group’s control of the
state. Such “benefits” are most likely to arise when the state is weak internally (e.g., low
solidarity among various in- groups) and has suffered past defeats in war and losses of territory.
The out-group being identified as outside the universe of the in-group’s moral obligation,
however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for genocide. If this outing is combined with
current defeats in war and internal strife in which a “political or cultural crisis of national
identity” emerges, the risk of genocide increases (Fein 1979, p. 9). The genocide risk is further
magnified if the political elite adopts a new formula or narrative to justify and solidify its
political control and the potential cost of brutal treatment of the out-group is low (owing, for
example, to a low probability that third parties would intervene on behalf of the out-group). Such
conditions can vary from case to case and even within a given nation over time, giving rise the
phenomenon of genocide emerging in “fits and starts” or not emerging when it seemed likely it
would. Nevertheless, Fein’s conditions represent an “explanatory sketch” of genocide that can be
applied across many historical and potential future cases of mass atrocity.
Kuper’s (1977, 1981) early sociological research on genocide also contains perspectives
that remain highly relevant in genocide studies today. Among his many insights into the causes
of genocide and the failures of the international community to prevent mass atrocities are his
analyses of social processes of exclusion of an out-group and how these can lead to the
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rationalization of mass murder in the minds of perpetrators. Kuper (1977) describes how a
society can move to the point in which there is deep polarization between a dominant in-group
and a socially constructed out-group in which the stage is set for genocide:
Polarisation may be a deliberate policy, or an unpremeditated consequence of strategies
pursued. There are certain clichés of action, almost involuntary idiomatic actions, which
feed into the process of polarization. Action and reaction, premeditated and involuntary,
may so intermesh as to move violence to higher levels of destruction through escalating
cycles of polarisation (Kuper 1977, p. 127).
The movement of violence to higher levels can cause key perpetrators from the in-group to cross
a point of no return in which genocidal actions become socially “normal” and even rewarding
(e.g., through perpetrators’ career advancement and looting of victims assets). At its worst,
polarizing violence leads not only to extremes of brutality such as the torture and mass murder of
children, women, men, and the elderly, but such actions are seen as necessary and even “good”
for society. When the point of no return is crossed, the dominant group becomes “locked in” to a
program of destruction of the out-group such that moderate voices for peace are excluded:
By the middle ground, I refer to those relationships between people of different racial,
religious or ethnic background, and those ideologies, which might form the basis for
movements of inter-group cooperation and of radical change, without resort to destructive
violence. Where the carriers of these ideologies are significant in number or power, the
process of polarisation requires that they be appreciably recruited or coerced into one or
other of the warring camps, and that the irreducible minority is either silenced or
eliminated, at the same time that its ideologies of conciliation are discredited (Kuper
1977, p. 209).
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
As noted above in Figure 2, the number of people killed in genocides is often in the tens
or hundreds of thousands and, in some cases, in the millions. It is not possible (outside of city
bombing campaigns or weapons of mass destruction) for a small number of genocide architects
to kill such a large number of victims. Rather, it takes many people to become perpetrators of
genocide for thousands or millions of people from the out-group to be killed. For example, it is
estimated that between 100,000 and 500,000 people actively participated in the murder of six
million Jews during the Holocaust (Waller 2007, p. 16). For the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in
which about 750,000 people were murdered, Straus (2004) estimates that between 175,000 and
210,000 people actively participated in the killing. Since psychopathology is relatively rare, most
genocide scholars reach the disturbing conclusion that “ordinary people” (i.e., people like you
and me) must get caught up in social processes and cognitive states in which they become
willing to perpetrate, or refuse to resist, genocide. How can this be?
Social psychologists have added a great deal to our understanding of genocide
perpetration by ordinary people. Such explanations hinge on the distinction between what Roth
(2010, p. 199) calls situationism and dispositionalism. Under situationism, situational variables
(e.g., a person’s immediate social settings such as neighborhood and workplace) affect individual
and group behavior. Dispositionalism focuses on the internal dispositions of individuals (e.g.,
whether a person is aggressive or welcoming toward people from other groups). Among social
psychologists who do research on genocide, many lean strongly in the direction of situationism
to explain how ordinary people become perpetrators. For example, Waller (2007, p. 269) states
that evil behavior is “a product of situational influences that channel action in particular
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directions.” Similarly, Roth (2010, p. 199) indicates that “situational variables most often prove
determinative of individual and group behavior.”
According to Roth (2010, p. 199), the key factor that defines a person’s situation is “the
group or social norms that implicitly or explicitly govern expected behavior in the situation.”
Hence, many individuals who find themselves in a situation in which the social norms and
expectations are to discriminate against a people group, and even to have such people “cleansed”
from the social group, will come to participate in, or not resist, such norms. Tragically, such
situational pressures to conform to the genocide architects’ wishes by explicitly participating in
genocide or looking the other way occur in all genocides and for thousands of ordinary people.
Application of the situationist perspective to understanding genocide perpetration is built
upon several path-breaking experiments in social psychology, especially those of Asch (1951),
Milgram (1963), and Zimbardo (1971). The Asch experiment reveals a surprising degree of
conformity to an experimentally-contrived erroneous group norm. Figure 3 shows the
information presented to subjects in the experiment. Each subject was given the two cards shown
in the figure. The line on the first card is the exact length of line C on the second card, but the
subjects were not told this. Each subject was asked to state out loud which line on the second
card matched the length of the line on the first card. Various trials of eight male college students
participated in each run of the experiment, but only one of the eight was a true subject of the
experiment. Seven of the eight recruits were “actors” employed by Asch to construct an
erroneous group norm in order to study the behavior of the one true subject per trial. In each trial,
the seven actors would choose in turn the matching line on the right card and then the true
subject would choose last. In some trials the seven actors would unanimously choose the correct
line C, but in other trials they would unanimously choose the same incorrect line. For the trials in
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which the seven actors chose correctly, the rate of incorrect answers by subjects was less than
one percent. For the incorrect trials, however, Asch found, that 36.8 percent of subject choices
conformed to the actors’ erroneous selection. Moreover, subjects participated in multiple trials
and Asch found that 75 percent of subjects gave at least one wrong answer in the incorrect trials
in which they participated. The Asch experiment revealed a conformity effect associated with
situational variables that was not good news when thinking about genocide. If, owing to
situational variables, subjects could be prone to making erroneous choices when the costs of
doing so were small, how much more might they go along with or look the other way when
tyrannous leaders demanded conformity (through threats and rewards) to their genocidal aims.
FIGURE 3 – Pairs of cards used in the Asch conformity experiment
Card 1

Card 2

A

B

C

SOURCE: Based on Asch (1951)

Another foundational experiment in the situationist paradigm of social psychology is
Milgram (1963). The experiment involved three individuals: an “actor” pretending to be a
subject in the experiment, a person in a white coat who ran the experiment (the “authority”
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figure), and a true experimental subject. The actor was given the role of learner in the experiment
and the subject was a teacher who was directed to follow the orders of the authority figure
running the experiment. The subject believed that the assignment to the roles of learner and
teacher was random, but actually the assignment was rigged so that the actor would be the
learner and the subject the teacher. After the role assignments, the actor (learner) and subject
(teacher) were placed in separate rooms where they could hear but not see each other. Prior to the
actual running of the experiment, the subject was told that the learner had a heart condition and
the subject was given a relatively mild sample electric shock to experience what a low-level
shock would supposedly be like for the learner. In actuality, the learner did not receive any real
shocks, only pretend ones to see how the unknowing subject would react. The authority figure
instructed the subject to read a pair of words to the learner. The subject was told to then read the
first word of each pair and four possible answers, one of which aligned with the second word in
the pair. The learner would press a button to indicate which of the four possible answers aligned
with the second word in the pair. A correct answer would cause the subject to move to the next
word pair and repeat the exercise. An incorrect answer would be met with a slight shock of 15
volts at first, but increasing by 15 volts for each subsequent incorrect answer. The actor-learner
was pre-instructed to answer incorrectly with enough frequency that the volts administered by
the subject would escalate to higher levels, even those clearly labeled to the subject as severe.
Table 1 summarizes the intensity of shocks (ranging from 15 to 450 volts) that subjects
believed were in play during the experiment and the choices that the subjects made to administer
shocks at the direction of the authority figure. Prior to running the experiment, Milgram polled
14 Yale University senior psychology majors to gauge their expectation of the percent of
subjects in the experiment that would eventually choose the highest level of shock (450 volts,
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TABLE 1 – Shock levels chosen in Milgram obedience experiment
Shock Level Knowingly
Administered By Subject
(In Volts)
Slight Shock
15
30
45
60
Moderate Shock
75
90
105
120
Strong Shock
135
150
165
180
Very Strong Shock
195
210
225
240
Intense Shock
255
270
285
300
Extreme Intensity Shock
315
330
345
360
Danger: Severe Shock
375
390
405
420
XXX
435
450
SOURCE: Milgram (1963, p. 376)

Number Of Subjects (Out Of
40) For Whom This Was The
Maximum Shock
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
4
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
26
N=40
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labeled in the XXX range in Table 1). The mean response was that out of 100 subjects, 1.2
percent would eventually choose the highest level. The most “pessimistic” of the Yale seniors
predicted that 3 percent would go that high. Milgram found, however, that of the 40 subjects who
participated in the experiment, all selected at least an intense degree of shock (300 volts or more)
and 26 of the 40 (65 percent) chose the highest level of shock (450 volts). The results were all
the more surprising when considering that as the experiment moved into higher levels of voltage,
the actor-learner (who was not receiving real shocks) shrieked and screamed in ways that could
be heard by the subject. Even under these conditions of apparent suffering, subjects continued to
administer higher levels of shock because an authority figure in a white coat told them that it was
important that they continue. If, owing to obedience to authority, subjects could choose to
impose suffering when the cost of refusing to harm was so low, how much more might people be
prone to obey the authority of tyrannous leaders who can bring substantial penalties to bear on
those who refuse to go along with their genocidal aims.
A third foundational experiment in the situationist paradigm of social psychology is the
Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) on power relations between guards and prisoners (Zimbardo
1971). The experiment randomly assigned 24 subjects to the roles of prisoner and guard in a
mock prison situation that was supposed to play out over a period of two weeks. Zimbardo and
his research team found that those assigned to the role of guard came to act in strongly
authoritarian ways including subjecting the prisoners to physical punishment and psychological
torture. Meanwhile, some of the prisoners submitted to the abuse while others revolted. Owing to
the escalating abuse against the prisoners, the experiment was stopped after just six days. The
behavioral extremes revealed in the experiment, which surprised Zimbardo and the others on his
research team, suggested that it was not the personalities of the guards (i.e., their dispositions),

21
but the situations that the guards were in that facilitated their oppressive actions. Such
positioning of in-group authorities in dominance over those designated as an out-group lies at the
core of genocidal actions of extreme discrimination, including murder. The disturbing result of
the experiment is that ordinary people can come to “legitimize” in their own minds such abusive
behavior because they are (1) in a position of authority, (2) face no social or institutional context
restraining them, and (3) can cognitively learn to ignore the dissonance that might otherwise
arise in their minds indicating that what they are doing is wrong.

POLITICAL SCIENCE
As a discipline, political science did not really move into genocide research until the
1990s. According to Straus (2010, p. 167), the end of the Cold War in 1990 and a series of high
profile civil wars and genocides in the 1990s and the early 2000s (e.g., Balkan wars and mass
atrocities in the mid-to-late 1990s, Rwanda civil war and genocide in 1990-1994, atrocities in
Sudan/Darfur beginning in the early 2000s) fostered growing interest by political scientists in
genocide research. Further interest within the field was fueled by the UN Security Council’s
formation of a special advisor on genocide prevention in 2004, development of the
Responsibility to Protect norm at the 2005 UN World Summit, and release of a genocide
prevention report in 2008 by a team of scholars and policymakers led by former US Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright, and former US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen (Albright and
Cohen 2008, Straus 2010, pp. 167-168).
Among the many important research avenues brought to the study of genocide by
political scientists are four highlighted by Straus (2010, p. 168): (1) comparative study of
genocide, (2) importance of regime type (e.g., autocracy, anocracy, democracy, transitioning
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regime type) in understanding genocide, (3) rationalist explanations of genocide, and (4)
connections between war and genocide. Political scientists also promoted the application of
quantitative methods in genocide research including formal game theory models and assessments
of genocide risk using statistical methods.
An important example of comparative genocide research in political science is Melson
(1992), who compared and contrasted the Armenian genocide (1915-1918) and the Holocaust.
Among Melson’s key results was how, in each case, revolution prior to genocide divided people
into in-groups and out-groups and the emergence of a new war increased the risk that out-groups
would be seen as enemies of the state and targeted for extermination (Straus 2010, p. 170). Many
other political scientists followed in Melson’s footsteps and studied multiple cases of genocide
and mass killing comparatively (see, e.g., Valentino 2004 and Midlarsky 2005).
Another type of comparative research is to apply statistical methods to a large sample of
countries to ascertain risk factors for genocide. Krain (1997), for example, statistically analyzed
genocide risk factors for the perio201 1948 to 1982 based on a sample of about 4000 countryyear observations containing 35 genocides. Krain found that civil war is a strong predictor of
genocide onset and interstate war and periods of decolonization also increase risk. The most
prominent empirical study of genocide risk in the literature is Harff (2003), who identified 126
countries that experienced state failure (e.g., regime collapse, civil war) at some point in the
1955 to 1997 period. Of the 126 cases of state failure, 35 culminated in genocide. Conditioned
on state failure, Harff’s statistical analysis identified six key risk factors for genocide: (1)
magnitude of political upheaval, (2) history of prior genocide, (3) exclusionary ideology by the
ruling elite, (4) autocratic regime, (5) ethnic minority elite, and (6) low trade openness. The
empirical work of Krain and Harff were foundational to an emerging body of statistical research

23
on genocide risk, conducted mostly by political scientists, which currently numbers about three
dozen publications (for a review of this literature, see Hoeffler 2016).
Many comparative case studies and, especially, empirical studies in political science find
that non-democratic regimes (e.g., autocracy, anocracy) correlate to greater genocide risk. For
example, according to Rummel (1998), autocracy is the major risk factor for genocide and other
mass atrocities perpetrated by governments. Moreover, one of Harff’s six risk factors noted
above is autocracy. But such results are subject to controversy among scholars. For example,
many genocide and mass killing (GMK) samples used in empirical research focus on the postWorld War II period. There is strong evidence that some democratic states committed or allowed
GMKs in the past, for example, against native peoples. Such cases that occurred in earlier
centuries or prior to World War II would not be part of the samples of modern empirical
genocide research. Moreover, new empirical research is beginning to consider that it may not be
regime type per se, but the transition of a political regime (e.g., transition from autocracy to
anocracy and then to democracy), that may be most important for understanding genocide risk.
For example, Anderton and Carter (2105) found strong empirical evidence of an inverted-U
relationship between regime type and genocide risk based on a sample of close to 200 countries
over the 1956-2006 period. Their result is summarized in Figure 4. The figure implies that,
controlling for other factors, autocracies have a greater risk of genocide than democracies, but
“in-between” political regimes (i.e., anocracies) have the greatest risk. An oft-cited goal in
international affairs is to help states transition from autocracy to democracy. Figure 4 implies,
however, that, everything else the same, such transitions will first move through anocracy in
which genocide risk rises before it finally decreases in the democratic zone. Hence, pushing
states from autocracy to democracy could initially elevate the GMK risk.
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FIGURE 4 – Regime type and genocide risk (inverted-u hypothesis)
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The figure shows that, controlling for other factors, autocracy is correlated with greater genocide
risk than democracy, but intermediate regime types (i.e., anocracies) have the highest risk.
SOURCE: Based on empirical results in Anderton and Carter (2015, pp. 20-22)

Another important contribution by political scientists to the study of genocide is the
consideration of the goals of genocide architects and the notion that their choice of genocide can
be “rational.” The word rational does not mean reasonable. In the social sciences, a rational
decision is one in which the decisionmaker weighs the expected costs and benefits of various
possible actions and choses an action designed to achieve the greatest feasible net benefit. A
rational decision implies that the person has a motive in making her or his choice and is trying to
achieve some objective. The choice could be horrific (e.g., murder, genocide), but if the choice is
deliberately taken to achieve an objective, it is in this sense rational. One of the main motives for
genocide and mass killing emphasized by political scientists is the strategic use of civilian
extermination campaigns to increase or retain political power and/or territorial control when
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facing threats from internal enemies. For example, the political elite in a weakened regime may
perceive that killing civilians would weaken a rebel group that is dependent on civilian support,
compel civilians to align with the state to protect their lives, and/or cause other groups within the
state to more strongly support the political elite (e.g., by being rewarded with looted assets from
those designated as out-groups) (see, e.g., Valentino 2004, Midlarsky 2005, Kalyvas 2006).
Finally, we note the importance of political science research on connections between war
and mass atrocity. Virtually all genocides and mass killings occur in the context of war, although
the reverse does not hold (i.e., there are many wars in which mass atrocities do not occur).
Furthermore, almost all empirical studies of genocide risk that include war as a risk assessment
variable find a positive correlation between war and genocide risk (Hoeffler 2016). One of the
main explanations for the elevated risk of genocide during war is that war typically challenges
the ruling elite’s hold on political power. In many wars, especially civil wars, if the political elite
loses, they will no longer have political power and may be incarcerated or executed. Hence, for
the political elite, war can represent an existential threat. In extreme cases of existential threat,
some political leaders have been willing to do just about anything to retain their hold on power,
including carrying out atrocities against civilians. For more detailed analyses of connections
between war and genocide, see Shaw (2003, 2007).

ECONOMICS
Substantial research on genocide by economists has begun to emerge only within the last
several years.4 Following Anderton and Brauer (2016b), Figure 5 highlights six critical ways in

4

For examples of early research on economic aspects of genocide see the citations in Anderton (2014, note 11). For
more recent scholarship on genocide economics see the forthcoming 28-chapter edited volume on economic aspects
of genocides and their prevention (Anderton and Brauer 2016a).
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which genocides and mass killings (GMKs) are interconnected with economics as shown by the
six boxes. Box 1 emphasizes the principle that GMKs are choices. As a social science devoted to
the study of human choices, an extensive menu of theoretical models is available in economics
(e.g., constrained optimization and game theory models) which can be applied to understand
GMK choices and consequences. In economics, a distinction is often made between rational and
nonrational motives underlying choices. Rational choice involves the purposeful weighing of
expected costs and benefits by a decisionmaker over various feasible actions and the selection of
the action that maximizes net benefits. Nonrational factors include social, psychological, and
neurobiological phenomena that can cause choices to deviate from the strict predictions of
rational choice theory. Box 2 implies that economic conditions (e.g., low per capita income, high
unemployment) can affect the risk and seriousness of GMKs. The third box shows that GMKs
can have significant economic effects via the “five Ds”: disruption of economic outcomes caused
by GMK such as diminished growth; diversion of resources away from ordinary economic
activities such as building roads and education into attacking civilians; displacement of people
such as refugees or internally displaced people fleeing violence; destruction of people and
property; and the difficulty of post-GMK development. Box 4 highlights the wealth
appropriation aspect of GMKs, which includes looting victims’ assets (e.g., homes, jewelry) and
bodies (e.g., enslavement, sexual exploitation) by genocide perpetrators. Box 5 shows that
GMKs involve the application of business practices including efficient organization, supply
chain and transportation management, resource acquisitions, and so on. Finally, the sixth box
highlights that economies are critically dependent on underlying socioeconomic phenomena
including security, health, and rule of law. When architects and perpetrators carry out GMK, they
typically attack several, and often all, of these elements of a people group’s economic vitality.
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FIGURE 5 – Key economic aspects of genocides and mass killings
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SOURCE: Adapted from Anderton and Brauer (2016b)

One of the most important developments in economics over the past half century has
been the emergence of a new field within the discipline, namely behavioral economics, in which
“insights from laboratory experiments, psychology, and other social sciences [are applied] in
economics” in conjunction “with the standard economic [rational choice] model to get a better
understanding” of human choices (Cartwright 2011, p. 4). Behavioral economics is a multi- and
interdisciplinary field involving collaborative research among economists, social psychologists,
psychologists, and others. There has been little application of the insights from behavioral
economics to genocide, but there are two key discoveries within the field – loss aversion and
psychic numbing – that are relevant for understanding why genocide architects choose mass
atrocity and why potential third party interveners to stop genocide often do nothing.
Numerous experiments in behavioral economics have found that, relative to a previously
established status quo (or reference point) such as current political power or territorial control, a
decisionmaker perceives her or himself to be worse off from a loss than an equivalent gain
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makes the person feel better off. This phenomenon is known as loss aversion. For example, if a
political leader loses 100 acres of territory, the loss that the leader experiences will be much
greater than the gain the leader would experience if 100 additional acres were acquired. What
behavioral economists have discovered is that humans tend to “cognitively magnify” losses
relative to equivalent gains beyond what standard rational choice theory predicts. Why is loss
aversion potentially important for understanding genocide? Many case studies, theoretical
models, and empirical studies of genocide posit that political leaders experience extreme
pressure and even personal threat when they are losing an interstate war or losing control of their
government to a rebel group. Such losses were characterized above as “existential threat.”
Rational choice and game theory models predict that, under certain conditions, political leaders
will make extreme choices, sometimes even mass killing and genocide, to secure their control.
Loss aversion suggests that such extreme choices would be more likely and more pronounced
than even rational choice theory predicts because leaders would cognitively magnify the
implications of such losses.5
Another critical discovery from behavioral economics, with important implications for
genocide prevention, is psychic numbing. Based on extensive research on human cognitive and
affective abilities (and inabilities), behavioral economists have discovered that people will often
not care much more about large losses of life relative to small losses of life, and they may even
care less. Slovic, et al. (2016) provide many examples of such psychic numbing including
research that shows that people are less willing to send clean water to save lives in a refugee
camp that was large (250,000) rather than small (11,000), people are more willing to donate
money to Save the Children to feed an identified individual (a seven-year-old African girl named
5

Midlarsky (2005, chapters 5, 7, and 18) and Anderton and Brauer (2016c) explicitly introduce loss aversion into a
theoretical analysis of genocide choice.

29
Rokia) than to donate to the same organization to help millions of Africans, and people are less
willing to donate money to help two starving children than to help one. Slovic, et al. (2016) offer
detailed analyses of psychic numbing and the importance of the phenomenon for understanding
why individual citizens and political leaders in third party states that might intervene to help
threatened populations seem complacent and prone to do nothing. These authors also provide
numerous policy prescriptions for overcoming the problem of psychic numbing in genocide
prevention policy.
Both loss aversion and psychic numbing can be pictured using variants of the famous Sshaped function from behavioral economics (Kahneman 2011, p. 282). In panel (a) of Figure 6,
the S-shaped function moves from the lower left negative quadrant to the upper right positive
quadrant. This panel applies to the decionmaking of a political leader who psychologically
values the gain or loss of, say, territory. The vertical axis measures the psychological values
associated with territorial losses (in the negative quadrant) and territorial gains (in the positive
quadrant). The horizontal axes measures possible losses in territory (in the negative quadrant)
and possible gains in territory (in the positive quadrant). Loss aversion is depicted in panel (a) in
the following way: the psychological value of a loss in 100 acres of territory (measured by
distance 0b) is much greater than the psychological value of a gain in 100 acres of territory
(measured by distance 0a). This also holds for the psychological values associated with losses
and gains of 200 acres (i.e., distance cd > distance ef). Hence, in panel (a) of Figure 6 the
psychological value of losses is magnified relative to the psychological value of equivalent gains.
Psychic numbing is shown in panel (b) of Figure 6. The vertical axis measures the
psychological value or importance of the loss of life to political leaders in a third party country,
which might potentially intervene to protect victims of genocide. The horizontal axis measures
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the magnitude of losses of life. Psychic numbing is depicted in panel (b) in the following way:
the psychological importance to third party political leaders of a loss of 10,000 lives in a nation
experiencing genocide is measured by distance 0h, but the incremental psychological value of
another 10,000 lives lost (out to 20,000 in total) is only the distance hi. Hence, political leaders
in panel (b) care very little about additional losses of life. Moreover, given the near flatness of
the curve at higher levels of fatalities (e.g., 50,000 and greater), the incremental value attached to
further losses of life is virtually zero. Even more disturbingly, Slovic, et al. (2016) maintain that
experimental evidence on psychic numbing cannot rule out the possibility that the curve in panel
(b) turns down, which implies that third parties would come to care less (incrementally and in
total) about a greater number of lives lost relative to a smaller amount lost.

CONCLUSIONS
Research on mass atrocities from the four social sciences summarized in this article, as
well as important contributions from many other disciplines not covered here, is culminating in a
truly multi- and inter-disciplinary effort to understand the causes of genocides and mass killings
and how they can be prevented. Even across just the four social sciences covered here, scholars
are employing a variety of tools and theoretical concepts, bringing to bear their own discipline’s
comparative strengths in understanding genocide, and willingly drawing upon the ideas of other
disciplines to enhance their own research effectiveness. Just one example of the fruitfulness of
cross-pollinated research in genocide studies is how the choices of genocide architects and
perpetrators can have rational motivations (as emphasized in economics), but also critically
important nonrational elements as emphasized in sociology, social psychology, and political
science such as the importance of social and cultural context, existential threat and loss aversion,
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FIGURE 6 – S-shaped curve from behavioral economics illustrating loss aversion and psychic numbing
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cognitive and affective disabilities and psychic numbing, and the importance of status quo (or
reference point) political power. I anticipate that over the coming decades there will be further
integration and maybe even unification of the social and behavioral sciences regarding how
people make choices, which in turn will help scholars and policymakers to better understand and
prevent mass atrocities.
Meanwhile, in the world right now, mass atrocities are taking place. Moreover, future
genocides and mass killings are being plotted right now in the minds of potential architects and
perpetrators. The social sciences (and other disciplines) are stating very loudly that such
atrocities will continue to occur until policymakers and citizens more generally come to fully
appreciate that the rational and nonrational motivations for genocide and mass killing can be
very strong in the minds of potential perpetrators and that the incentives for potential third
parties to help victims can be stunted owing to human cognitive and affective limitations. The
current challenge facing scholars, policymakers, and activists devoted to genocide prevention is
how to integrate what has been learned about the causes of genocide, and will continue to be
learned, into new and innovative policies to prevent genocide. Although the motives for
genocide and mass killing remain strong in the world, we know more about the insidious nature
and effects of such motives. One hopeful aspect of this otherwise disturbing reality is that
incentives can be changed. Perhaps one day, the choice of genocide or mass killing can become
incentivized to be as rare as it should be, which is “Never Again.”

REFERENCES
ALBRIGHT, M.K. and COHEN, W.S., Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policymakers (New York: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008).
ANDERTON, C.H. ‘A Research Agenda for the Economic Study of Genocide: Signposts from
the Field of Conflict Economics’, Journal of Genocide Research, 16 (2014), 113-138.

33
---. ‘Datasets and Trends of Genocides, Mass Killings, and Other Civilian Atrocities’, in
Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, ed. by C.H.
ANDERTON and J. BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016 (forthcoming)),
chapter 3.
ANDERTON, C.H. and BRAUER , J., eds. Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass
Atrocities, and Their Prevention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016a (forthcoming)).
---., ‘On the Economics of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention’, in
Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, ed. by C.H.
ANDERTON and J. BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016b (forthcoming)),
chapter 1.
---., ‘Genocide and Mass Killing Risk and Prevention: Perspectives from Constrained
Optimization Models’, in Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their
Prevention, ed. by C.H. ANDERTON and J. BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press,
2016c (forthcoming)), chapter 6.
ANDERTON, C.H. and CARTER, J.R., ‘A New Look at Weak State Conditions and Genocide
Risk’, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 21 (2015), 1-36.
ASCH, S.E. ‘Effects of Group Pressure on the Modification and Distortion of Judgments’, in
Groups, Leadership and Men, ed. by H. GUETZKOW (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press, 1951),
177-190.
BAUMAN, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
CARTWRIGHT, E., Behavioral Economics (New York: Routledge, 2011).
CURTHOYS, A. and DOCKER, J., ‘Defining Genocide’, in The Historiography of Genocide,
ed. by D. STONE (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 9-41.
DICKS, H.V., ‘Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology: A War-Time Study of
German Prisoners of War’, Human Relations, 3 (1950), 111-154.
FEIN, H., Accounting for Genocide: Victims – and Survivors – of the Holocaust (London:
The Free Press, 1979).
---., Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1993).
GILBERT, G.M., The Psychology of Dictatorship: Based on an Examination of the Leaders
of Nazi Germany (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950).
HARFF, B., ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder Since 1955’, American Political Science Review, 97 (2003), 57-73.
HOEFFLER, A., ‘Development and the Risk of Mass Atrocities: An Assessment of the
Empirical Literature’, in Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their

34
Prevention, ed. by C.H. ANDERTON and J. BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press,
2016 (forthcoming)), chapter 10.
KAHNEMAN, D., Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
KALYVAS, S.N., The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
KUPER, L., The Pity of it All: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations (London:
Duckworth, 1977).
---., Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin,
1981).
KRAIN, M., ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and
Politicides’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (1997), 331-360.
LEMKIN, R., Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government,
Proposals for Redress (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
MARSHALL, M.G., GURR, T.R., and HARFF, B. ‘PITF - State Failure Problem Set: Internal
Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2014’, (Vienna, VA: Societal-Systems Research, Inc.,
2015).
MEIERHENRICH, J., ed., Genocide: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
MELSON, R., Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the
Holocaust (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
MIDLARSKY, M.I., The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
MILGRAM, S., ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’, Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 67 (1963), 371-378.
PÉGORIER, C., Ethnic Cleansing: A Legal Qualification (New York: Routledge, 2013).
ROTH, P.A., ‘Social Psychology and Genocide’, in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide
Studies, ed. D. BLOXHAM and A.D. MOSES (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.
198-216.
RUMMEL, R.J., Statistics of Genocide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (Piscataway,
NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1998).
SHAW, M., War & Genocide (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003).
---., What is Genocide? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007).

35
---., ‘Sociology and Genocide’, in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. D.
BLOXHAM and A.D. MOSES (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 142-162.
SLOVIC, P., VÄSTFJÄLL, D., GREGORY, R., and OLSON, K.G., ‘Valuing Lives You Might
Save: Understanding Psychic Numbing in the Face of Genocide’, in Economic Aspects of
Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, ed. by C.H. ANDERTON and J.
BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016 (forthcoming)), chapter 26.
STAUB, E., The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
STRAUS, S., ‘How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate’,
Journal of Genocide Research 6 (2004), 85-98.
---., ‘Political Science and Genocide’, in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. D.
BLOXHAM and A.D. MOSES (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 163-181.
ULFELDER, J. and VALENTINO, B., ‘Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing’,
Working Paper, 2008. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1703426.
UNITED NATIONS, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (New York: United Nations, 1948), https://treaties.un.org.
VALENTINO, B.A., Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2004).
VON JOEDEN-FORGEY, E., ‘Gender and the Genocidal Economy’, in Economic Aspects of
Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, ed. by C.H. ANDERTON and J.
BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016 (forthcoming)), chapter 17.
WALLER, J.E., Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing,
2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
---. ‘“A Crime Without a Name”: Defining Genocide and Mass Atrocity’, in Economic Aspects
of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, ed. by C.H. ANDERTON and J.
BRAUER (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016 (forthcoming)), chapter 2.
ZIMBARDO, P.G., ‘The Power and Pathology of Imprisonment’, Congressional Record (Serial
No. 15, 1971-10-25). Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session on Corrections, Part II,
Prisons, Prison Reform and Prisoner’s Rights: California. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971).

